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The function of rules of syntax is simply to identify the corresponding rules 
of semantics. It is therefore to be expected that the rules of natural language 
syntax and semantics should be related in a straightforward way. Less ob- 
viously, but for similar reasons, it is also to be expected that the rules and 
structures involved in processing should be equally directly related, a version 
of what is usually called the "Competence Hypothesis". The latter position 
has repeatedly been endorsed within the generative tradition (cf. Chomsky 
[20, p. 101, [22, p.71). These expectations arise not only from considerations 
of theoretical parsimony, but also from the observation that the develop- 
ment of language in children (and as far as anyone can tell the evolution of 
the language faculty in the species) is extremely rapid. Any increase in the 
complexity of the relations between these modules increases the explanatory 
burden on the theory of acquisition, evolution, or both. 
It does not of course follow that observations concerning the different 
members of this trinity can be expected to be equally productive of insights 
into the nature of the system as a whole. Modern linguistics is founded on 
*To appear in: H. Kamp and C.Rohrer, (eds.), Aspects of Computational Linguistics, 
Springer Verlag. Thanks to the following for reading the draft and for many helpful 
comments: Aravind Joshi, Mitch Marcus, Michael Niv, Phil Resnik, Bonnie Lynn Webber. 
research was supported in part by NSF grant nos IRI90-18513 and CISE IIP, CDA 88- 
22719 , DARPA grant no. N00014-90-J-1863, and ARO grant no. DAAL03-89-C0031. 
the assumption that there is, in Chomsky's words, "little reason to question 
the traditional view that investigation of performance will proceed only so 
far as understanding of underlying competence permits" ([20, p.101) and that 
equally (albeit in a weaker sense) there is "little evidence that 'intuition about 
meaning7 is at  all useful in the actual investigation of linguistic form" ([19, 
P-941)- 
The insight that syntactic phenomena alone offer an effective and reliable 
source of data concerning the workings of the language faculty has been so 
productive of generalisations and results concerning its nature that it is quite 
inconceivable that we should abandon it now. It is worth calling to mind the 
reasons why it continues to bind us. 
The methodological priority of competence over performance seems to fol- 
low from the exceedingly fortunate fact that the process of mapping natural 
language strings onto their interpretations happens to be one for which the 
abstract nature or "theory" of the computation can be specified at a more 
general level than the particular algorithm that is actually used to  carry it 
out. It is quite unlikely that we could ever analyse a system as ramified as 
natural language if it were not decomposable, as Marr [58] points out.' We 
know that even for quite simple classes of language, there are very many 
processing algorithms. Exactly how many there are, and the number of de- 
grees of freedom that they offer us to account for performance data, depends 
upon what further assumptions we are willing to make. However, in advance 
of knowing exactly what it is that the corresponding algorithms for natural 
language actually compute, we have no clear grounds for limiting these as- 
sumptions, so the search space is bound to be very much larger if we start 
from the performance end. 
The methodological priority of syntax over semantics is not a necessary 
truth in the same sense, and is by no means total. In fact, however, we do 
not seem to have very reliable access to semantics at  the level of sentence 
grammar. That is not to deny that we have strong intuitions about meaning 
'It is ironic that Marr, who offered a particularly clear interpretation of competence vs. 
performance as "theory of computation" vs. "algorithm", expressed some doubt whether 
natural language was in fact one of the systems that are decomposable in this way. While 
many more neurally-embedded and less symbolically-mediated aspects of cognition may 
have this character, it seems unlikely that any symbolic system like language could fail t o  
be decomposable in this way. 
at the level of propositions, referring expressions, and relations among them, 
such as coreference and entailment. However, this level of meaning seems 
to arise very far down the chain of language understanding. It is evidently 
too coarse to explain the very diverse ways in which the same propositional 
meaning can be grammatically realised as an (active, passive, topicalised, 
cleft, or whatever) sentence, subject to the demands of context. For that 
reason, this notion of meaning gives us very little help in understanding how 
sentences give rise to meanings. That process just seems to be very opaque 
to introspection. 
These principles thus very strongly constrain the proper conduct of lin- 
guistic investigations. Nevertheless, commonsense continues to suggest that 
both semantics and the operations of the human sentence processor will in 
fact turn out to stand in the closest possible relation to natural language 
syntax, when we come to understand them properly. In particular, in the 
absence of other factors, we would certainly expect syntax and semantics to  
stand in what Bach [5] has called a LLrule-to-rule" relation, according to which 
each syntactic rule corresponds to a rule of semantic interpretation. In the 
first part of the paper, I shall argue that this commonplace observation, if 
taken seriously, has some far-reaching implications for the theory of grammar. 
More contentiously, the second part of the paper will argue that we would 
expect the structures manipulated by the processor to be isomorphic to the 
constituents licensed by the grammar, an extreme version of Bresnan and 
Kaplan's [17] "Strong Competence Hypothesis" that will be distinguished 
as the "Strict" Competence Hypothesis. The claim will be that the the- 
ory of grammar defended in the first part adheres more closely to this very 
restrictive hypothesis than the alternatives do. This position has recently 
been opposed by Stabler [81], and his criticisms will also be considered in the 
second part of the paper. 
The artificial languages that we design ourselves, such as predicate logic or 
the programming language Lisp, exhibit a very strong form of a "rule-to-rule" 
relation between syntax and semantics as they are defined in the textbook 
or reference manual. The rule-to-rule hypothesis as it is used here can be 
stated as follows: 
(1) THE RULE-TO-RULE ASSUMPTION: syntactic rules and syntactic 
constituents are paired with semantic translations. 
The fact that syntax functions so straightforwardly as the handmaiden of 
semantics in these languages is so reasonable and desirable that it might be 
expected to transcend all particulars of function and content. It is reasonable 
to expect the natural system to exhibit the same property because it is hard 
to imagine any evolutionary pressure that would force it to be otherwise. 
Indeed, there is at least one identifiable force that can be expected to work 
positively to keep them in line. It arises from the fact that children have to 
learn the language, apparently on the basis of quite unsystematic presenta- 
tion of positive instances alone. Since even such trivial classes of grammars 
as finite state grammars are not learnable from mere exposure to positive 
instances of the strings of the language (cf. Gold [40]), and since there is 
pretty clear evidence that no more explicit guidance is provided by adults 
(cf. Brown and Hanlon [13]), some other source of information, "innate" 
in the sense that it is available to the child prior to the acquisition of any 
specific language, must guide them. As has often been pointed out, the most 
promising candidate a priori is semantic interpretation or the related concep- 
tual representation.2 It is likely t hat this cognitive representation includes 
such grammatically relevant notions as actual and potential participants and 
properties of events, and the attentional focus of other conversational par- 
ticipants, as well as the phenomenal reflections of the physical ~ i tua t ion .~  
42.1 CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE-TO-RULE ASSUMPTION 
21n the context of modern linguistics, the suggestion goes back at least to Chornsky 
[20, p.591 and Miller [61]. Of course it is a much older idea. See Pinker [71] for a review of 
some proposed mechanisms, and see Gleitman [39] for some cogent warnings against the as- 
sumption that such semantic representations have their origin solely in present perception 
and the material world in any simple sense of that term. 
3~owever inadequate our formal (and even informal) grasp on the child's prelinguistic 
conceptualisation of the situation, there can be no doubt that it includes such aspects, for 
even non-linguistic animals have that much. 
A number of consequences follow. The first, which follows from the ex- 
pectation of transparency between syntax and semantics, is so strong and 
so utterly uncontentious that no theory of grammar has failed to observe it 
in spirit, though it is probably true to say that none have so far succeeded 
in following it to the letter. From the claim that syntax and semantics are 
rule-to-rule, it immediately follows that the syntactic entities that are com- 
bined by a syntactic rule must be semantically interpretable. (Otherwise, 
they could not be combined by the semantic interpretation of the rule). It 
follows that syntactic rules can only combine or yield constituents. 
This condition, which has been called "The Constituent Condition on 
Rules", has been a central feature of Generative Grammar from its earli- 
est moments. It frequently surfaces in that literature in the guise of the 
"Structure Dependency" of grammatical rules. It is also the notion that is 
embodied in the "Proper Analysis" condition on transformations of Chomsky 
[22] (written in 1955). The most illuminating and ambitious endorsement of 
the principle is to be found in [22, p.210-2111 (chapters written in 1956) where 
the following four criteria are offered as tests for grammatical constituency: 
1. [Susceptibility to] the rule for conjunction 
2. [Resistance to] intrusion of parenthetical expressions 
3. Ability to enter into transformations 
4. [Cooccurrence with] certain intonational features [associated with in- 
tonational phrases] 
These criteria are very cautiously advanced, carefully surrounded with qual- 
ifications, and the subsequent discussion is deliberately designed to demon- 
strate that some of them at least raise as many questions as they answer. 
Nevertheless, there is an implicit claim of great boldness, however program- 
matically stated. If these operations are tests for constituency, it can only 
be because they are rules of grammar, subject to the constituent condition. 
The bulk of The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, and most work 
in Generative Grammar since, mainly bears on the claim relative to the 
third criterion, concerning transformational rules of movement (and their 
modern equivalents and alternatives). By and large, such rules have been 
scrupulously true to the constituent condition. It has proved much more 
difficult to make good on the implicit claim with respect to the remaining 
three phenomena. Theories of coordination, intonation, and (inasfar as there 
are any) parentheticalisation have generally been forced at  some point to 
compromise the constituent condition. The present work should be viewed 
as an attempt to  vindicate the original claim. 
Before proceeding to examine this claim in further detail in the next 
section, it is worth noting that two further consequences follow from the as- 
sumption of a rule-to-rule relation between syntax and semantics. First, the 
assumption also implies that the only linguistic entities that have interpre- 
tations are constituents. This consequence is again entirely uncontentious, 
and virtually all theories of competence have adhered to it (inasfar as they 
have involved an explicit semantics at all). However, it will be relevant to 
the discussion of processing below, for it implies that if we ever find ourselves 
wanting to argue that the processor has access to to a structure that is not a 
grammatical constituent, such as the combination of a subject and a transi- 
tive verb Harry found, then we may have violated the strict version of strong 
competence. 
Finally, and slightly more controversially, the rule-to-rule hypothesis, and 
its justification in terms of its parsimony with respect to the theory of lan- 
guage learning and evolution, imply that syntactic and semantic rules should 
have the property of "monotonicity". That is, there can be no rules such as 
old-style transformations which convert structures which are ill-formed (at 
either level) into structures which are well-formed. The involvement of any 
intermediate, uninterpretable level of structure - such as an old-style surface 
structure - immediately raises the question of how that level of grammar can 
be learned, compromising the parsimony of the theory. The most straight- 
forward way of interpreting this condition is as implying that the grammar 
should be "monostratal", in the sense of having a single level of syntactic 
structure, directly associated with an interpretation.4 
*To claim that syntax is monostratal in is not of course to  deny that theories of language 
need t o  recognise distinct modules such as phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics. 
It  does on the other hand imply that those levels too should be monotonically related, a 
point to which we return below. 
To what extent do the facts of natural language syntax conform to the pre- 
dictions set out above? The generative theoretical tradition, as was noted 
earlier, has had considerable success in accounting for many constructions 
involving discontiguities between elements that are semantically dependent 
upon one another. Many such constructions were originally brought within 
the fold of the constituent condition on rules by the introduction of trans- 
formational rules of "movement" of constituents. Such constructions fall 
naturally into two groups. The first group includes phenomena which can be 
accounted for entirely in terms of "bounded" dependencies - roughly, depen- 
dencies between items which occur within the same clause, as in the following 
examples:5 
(2) a. John expects that Harry will take a bath 
b. John expects Harry to take a bath 
c. John expects to take a bath 
d. Harry is expected to take a bath by John 
As Brame [ll], [12], and Bresnan [16] were among the first to point out, 
the clause-bounded nature of these dependencies means that they can be 
base-generated, or (equivalently) specified in the lexicon, thus bringing them 
within the domain of the constituent condition without the use of movement 
as such. The present work will have little more to say about the bounded 
constructions. 
The generative approach has also proved extremely successful in account- 
ing for the phenomenon of unbounded dependency exhibited in relative clauses 
and topicalisations such as the following, again in terms of movement: 
(3) a. That book, I expect I shall find 
b. These articles, I think that you must have read without understanding. 
In such constructions, elements that are related in the interpretation of the 
construction, such as the extracted NPs and the verb(s) of which they are 
51t will be apparent from the examples that the definition of clause here needs further 
specification. 
the objects, can be separated by arbitrarily long substrings and indefinitely 
much embedding. While the residue of topicalisation or relativisation clause 
at first glance looks like a non-constituent fragment of a sentence, it can 
be rather satisfactorily regarded as a constituent of type S, with a special 
kind of "invisible" or "moved" argument, and thereby be brought within 
the constituent condition. While it has also been proposed to bring these 
constructions too within the scope of base-generative and lexical rules (see 
Gazdar, [38], passim), the early theories were so productive of generalisations 
concerning these constructions that it will be convenient in what follows to 
continue to describe them in terms of movement, regardless of the fact that 
the present theory in fact eschews rules of movement entirely. 
It has proved much more difficult to account for coordination, paren- 
t heticalisation, and phrasal intonation within the confines of the constituent 
condition. It is worth looking at some data in this connection. 
At first glance, there is a striking overlap between the kinds of fragments 
that result from relativisation and the related topicalising construction, and 
those that can coordinate. In particular, practically anything that can occur 
as the residue of leftward movement can be coordinated, as in examples like 
the following: 
(4) a. A book which I expect I shall find, 
and I think that you must have  ad without really understanding. 
b. I expect I shall find, 
but I think that you must have read without really understanding, 
my novel about the secret life of legumes. 
The second example involves rightward movement (again, the term is used de- 
scriptively). It is also striking that there is a similarly overwhelming (though 
not quite so complete) conspiracy between the residues of leftward and right- 
ward movement. That is, most residues that arise from leftward movement 
can also arise from rightward m~vemen t .~  
However, the fragments that result from coordination are much more 
'The obvious exception arises in subject extraction. 
8 
diverse than those that result from (leftward and rightward) movement. For 
example: 
(5) a. I want to try to write, and hope to see produced, 
a movie about the secret life of vegetables. 
b. Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Friends of the Vegetable Film Society? 
c. I gave a policeman a flower, and a postman, a letter. 
d .  I want to try to write a novel, and you, a screenplay 
While considerably less attention has been devoted to parenthetical utter- 
ances (but cf. Emonds [31, section 11.91, McCawley [60] and Levelt [55]), 
some similarly unconstrained fragments arise from their intrusion, as in: 
(6) Are you, I ask myself, a member of the Friends of the Vegetable Film Society? 
The result has been that, while linguistic theories have had some success in 
accounting for the relative clause construction in terms of devices which re- 
instate the constituent condition by deriving such fragments from traditional 
constituents such as S via devices like movement [20], indexed "traces" [23], 
and feature-passing, [38], they have been much less successful in showing 
that the same devices will account for coordination. Instead, coordination 
has led to the introduction of rules of deletion to supplement rules of move- 
ment. Such rules again attempt to reinstate the constituent condition to 
the grammar, by deriving the fragments underlying S. However, such rules 
have frequently been forced to compromise the constituent condition. For 
example, 5c appears to require either the movement or the deletion of a 
non-constituent, and 5d appears to offer no alternative to the deletion of the 
non-constituent want t o  t r y  to write. More worrying still, this fragment looks 
suspiciously like the kind of fragment that is the surface-structural result of 
deletion or movement, as in 5a. This problem has turned out to be extremely 
resistant to  solution. 
This result is suprising, because intuitively all of these constructions ap- 
pear to be related to the semantic notion of abstraction, or definition of a 
property. Most obviously, a restrictive relative clause like (a) below seems to 
correspond to a predicate or property of being prefered by Mary. Formally 
such properties, concepts or abstractions can be conveniently and transpar- 
ently represented by terms in the A-calculus like (b): 
(7) a. . . . (which) Mary prefers 
b. Ax [prefer' x Mary'] 
(For those who are unfamiliar with this notation, the operator X declares the 
symbol x to be a variable local to the expression that follows. The expres- 
sion can therefore be thought of as denoting the property of being "a thing 
such that Mary prefers it" .) The variable is thus in every way comparable 
to  a parameter or formal variable of a subroutine or function in a computer 
programming language, and the operator X can be thought of as defining a 
function in such a language, mapping entities onto truth values according to 
whether Mary prefers them or not. (Here as elsewhere in the paper, con- 
stants like prefe# are used to identify semantic interpretations whose details 
are not of immediate interest, and a convention of "left associativity" of func- 
tion application is observed, so that the above formula is equivalent to Ax 
[ (prefe# x) Mard]). Most current theories of natural language grammar since 
"standard" transformational grammar (Chomsky [20]) more or less explicitly 
embody the analogy between relativisation and abstraction over a variable. 
Thus, the Government-Binding theory explicitly identifies traces as bound 
variables, while GPSG and its descendants use explicit variable binding via 
the lambda calculus in the interpretation of the slash categories that mediate 
long range dependencies (cf. Pollard and Sag [72]). However coordination 
is much freer than relativisation in the fragments that it generates, and has 
been resistant to satisfactory explanation in such terms. 
a3.2 INTONATION A D DISCOURSE CONTEXT 
Similar fragments abound in spoken language, arising from phenomena asso- 
ciated with prosody and intonation, as well as less well-behaved phenomena 
like restarts, and the parentheticals discussed earlier. For example, one quite 
normal prosody for an answer to  the following question (a) involving stress on 
the word Mary and a rise in pitch at the end of the word prefers, intuitively 
imposes the intonational structure indicated in (b) by the brackets (stress, 
marked in this case by raised pitch, is indicated by capitals):7 
'we shall not rely on mere intuition to define this phenomenon in the developments 
below. But the effect is very strong. It is ironic that one of the first difficulties in teaching 
introductory syntax is to persuade the students that this is not the notion of structure 
that is relevant to the study of grammar. Of course, in an important sense, they are right. 
(8) a. I know that Alice prefers VELVET. But what does MARY prefer? 
b. (MARY prefers) (CORDUROY). 
Such a grouping is orthogonal to the traditional syntactic structure of the 
sentence. 
Intonational structure nevertheless remains strongly constrained by mean- 
ing. For example, contours imposing bracketings like the following do not 
seem to be allowed, as Selkirk [78] has pointed out: 
(9) #(Three cats)(in ten prefer corduroy) 
Halliday [46] observed that this constraint, which Selkirk has called the 
"Sense Unit Condition", seems to follow from the function of phrasal in- 
tonation, which is to convey what will here be called "information structure" 
- that is, distinctions of focus, presupposition, and propositional attitude 
towards entities in the discourse model. These discourse entities are more 
diverse than mere noun-phrase or propositional referents, but they do not 
seem to include such non-concepts as "in ten prefer corduroy". 
Among the categories that they do include are what Wilson and Sper- 
ber [95] and Ellen Prince [73] have termed "open propositions". One way 
of introducing an open proposition into the discourse context is by asking 
a Wh-question. For example, the question in 8, What does M a y  prefer? 
introduces an open proposition, or topic of conversation, corresponding once 
again to the concept of a thing such that Mary prefers it. As Jackendoff [50] 
pointed out, it is once again natural to think of this open proposition as a 
functional abstraction, and to express it in the notation of the A-calculus, as 
in 7, repeated here:* 
When this function or concept is supplied with an argument corduroyt, it 
reduces to give a proposition, with the same function argument relations as 
the canonical sentence:' 
"he proposal is also implicit in the "structured propositions" approach of Cresswell 
[28] and von Stechow [80]. 
gAgain, function application associates to the left. 
(11) prefer' corduroy' mary' 
It is the presence of the above open proposition rather than some other that 
makes the intonation contour in 8b felicitous. (That is not to say that its 
presence uniquely determines this response, nor that its explicit mention is 
necessary for interpreting the response.) 
These observations have led linguists such as Selkirk to postulate a level 
of "intonational structure", independent of syntactic structure and related to 
information structure. The involvement of two apparently uncoupled levels 
of structure in natural language grammar appears to complicate the path 
from speech to interpretation unreasonably. 
It is therefore interesting to observe that the constructions considered in 
the previous section, whose semantics also seems to be reminiscent of func- 
tional abstraction, are also subject to something like a "sense unit conditionn. 
For example, strings like "in ten prefer corduroyn seem to be as reluctant to 
take part in coordination as they are to be treated as intonational phrases, 
and, to the extent that they are possible at all, demand strikingly similar 
contexts of utterance: 
(12) #Three cats in twenty like velvet, and in ten prefer corduroy. 
Since we have already noted that coordinate constructions constitute another 
major source of complexity for current theories of natural language grammar, 
and also offer serious obstacles to computational applications, it is tempting 
to suspect that this conspiracy between syntax and prosody might point to a 
unified notion of structure that is somewhat different from traditional surface 
constituency. 
It is slightly surprising that all of these constructions whose semantics is 
so directly related to the notion of functional abstraction give rise to  these 
strikingly similar kinds of fragment, in which there is no explicit linguistic 
manifestation of the bound variable itself. It seems odd that an element 
so central to the semantics of abstraction should be left implicit. (Bound 
variables are otherwise very directly realised in the syntax, for example in 
association with quantifiers.) 
It is interesting in this connection that there are systems other than the 
A-calculus which capture the notion of abstraction, but which eschew the 
use of bound variables entirely. These are the combinatory systems invented 
by Schiinfinkel and Curry as a formal foundation for the semantics of the 
A-calculus. In such systems (which will be discussed in detail below), terms 
equivalent to abstractions like the above are built up using a handful of 
elementary operations for combining functions, such as functional composi- 
tion. Systems using quite small numbers of combinators can be shown to be 
equivalent in expressive power to the A-calculi. 
The existence of these systems raises the possibility that alternative the- 
ories of grammar can be developed based as directly upon the combinatory 
applicative systems as the traditional ones are upon the A-calculus. The body 
of the present paper presents a theory of grammar in which syntactic rules 
corresponding to such combinators are used to lend the status of constituents 
to such substrings want to  try t o  write and even a policeman a flower in the 
above examples, without the use of movement or deletion. Such grammars 
will be seen to provide a unified treatment of a wide variety of syntactic 
phenomena in natural language, and to explain phenomena of long distance 
dependency (including relativisation), coordination, and intonation, within 
the confines of the constituent condition on rules, and in terms of a single 
principle. That principle is that the function-argument relations that hold in 
sentences of natural languages are projected from the relations defined in the 
lexicon by syntactic operations corresponding to combinators, rather than 
by operat ions explicitly or implicitly involving bound variables. The paper 
then goes on to show that the same notion of constituency can be used to 
explain spoken intonation. 
The theory of grammar that results will be characterised by a profusion 
of alternative surface analyses for any given sense of a moderately complex 
sentence. Part I1 of the paper discusses the nature of the human sentence pro- 
cessing mechanism, and argues that under the "strict" version of the strong 
competence hypothesis, these grammars are compatible with the simplest 
possible parser, and that they therefore have a further explanatory edge over 
alternative theories. 
Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG, [I], [83]) is an extension of Cat- 
egorial Grammar (CG, [2], [6]). That is to say that elements like verbs are 
associated with a syntactic "category" which identifies them as functions, 
and specifies the type and directionality of their argument(s) and the type 
of their result. The present paper uses a notation in which the argument or 
domain category always appea,rs to the right of the slash, and the result or 
range category to the left. A forward slash / means that the argument in 
question must appear on the right, while a backward slash \ means that the 
argument must appear on the left .lo 
(13) prefers := (S \NP) /NP:  prefer' 
The category (S\NP)/NP could be regarded as both a syntactic and a 
semantic object, as in the unification-based categorial grammars of Uszkoreit 
[91], Wittenburg [97], Zeevat et al. 1991 and Pareschi and Steedman [64]. (See 
[85] for an explicit expression of the present grammars in unification-based 
terms, uniting syntax and semantics in a single category.) However, it will 
be convenient for present purposes to separate the semantic and syntactic 
types in the notation. In the present paper, an expression identifying the 
translation of a category appears to its right, separated by a colon. It is of 
course the translation which determines the grammatical or functional role of 
the first argument to be that of the object, and the second to be the subject. 
Such functions can combine with arguments of the appropriate type and 
position by rules of functional application, written as follows: 
(14) The Functional Application Rules: 
Such rules are both syntactically and semantically rules of functional appli- 
cation, as is indicated by the interpretations that appear to the right of the 
colon for each category.'' They allow derivations like the following: 
''The reader is warned that other superficially similar notations are used by some of 
the other authors referred to here. 
llAgain, it is helpful for the present expository purposes to explicitly identify the seman- 
tics, but the semantic annotations are, strictly speaking, redundant, since the categories 
themselves can be regarded as both syntactic and semantic objects, as they are for example 
in [85]. 
(15) Mary prefers corduroy 
---- --------- -------- 
NP (S\NP)/NP NP 
---------------- > 
S\NP 
------------- < 
S 
The syntactic functional types are identical to the semantic types of their 
translations, apart from directionality. This derivation therefore also builds 
a compositional interpretation, which we will write prefer' corduroy' mary', 
using a convention of "left associativity" of functional application. Of course 
such a "pure" categorial grammar is context-free. 
Coordination might be included in CG via the following rule, allowing any 
constituents of like type, including functions, to form a single constituent of 
the same type, and thereby to take part in derivations exactly analogous to 
the above:12 
(16) X conj X X 
(17) I loath and detest corduroy 
-- --------- ---- --------- -------- 
NP (S\NP)/NP conj (S\NP)/NP NP 
........................ & 
(S\NP)/NP 
..................... > 
S\NP 
........................ < 
S 
In order to allow coordination of contiguous strings that do not constitute 
constituents, CCG generalises the grammar to allow certain operations on 
functions related to Curry's combinators [29], [79]. For example, functions 
may compose, as well as apply, under the following rule 
12Such a rule is in fact a simplification, and a more linguistically adequate account is 
presented elsewhere (cf. [85]), capturing the fact that conjunctions in English are proclitic, 
and associate t o  the rightmost conjunct. 
(18) Forward Composition: 
The most important single property of combinatory rules like this is that 
they have an invariant semantics. This one composes the interpretations of 
the functions that it applies to, as is apparent from the right hand side of the 
rule.13 Thus sentences like I prefer, and may recommend, corduroy can be 
accepted, via the following composition of two verbs (indexed as >B, follow- 
ing Curry's use of the identifier B for the composition combinator) to  yield a 
composite of the same category as a transitive verb. Crucially, composition 
also yields the appropriate interpretation, assuming that a semantics is also 
provided for the coordination rule. 
I prefer and may recommend the corduroy 
-- --------- ---- --------- --------- ---- -------- 
NP (S\NP)/NP conj (S\NP)/VP VP/NP NP/N N 
----------------->B --------- > 
(S\NP)/NP NP ............................ & 
(S\NP)/NP 
............................... > 
S\NP 
............................ < 
S 
In should be noted that this rule will potentially allow certain non- 
conjoinable sequences to compose and coordinate. For example, under the 
assumption that determiners are NPIN,  we could derive the following, by 
composing a transitive verb with a determiner: 
130nce again, the explicit identification of the semantics of this and all subsequent rules, 
using the notation of the A-calculus, is only used for expository clarity. The categories 
themselves are complete syntactic and semantic entities, and it is functional composition 
itself, embodied in the rule relating the categories themselves, that is the primitive of the 
theory, not the A operator. 
(20) *I must cook a,  and eat the, potato. 
------ ----- ---- ---- ----- ---- ------ 
S/VP V P / N P  NP/N conj VP/NP NP/N N 
---------- >B ---------- >B 
VP/N VP/N 
...................... <&> 
Such examples could be excluded by imposing a condition on the forward 
composition rule, forbidding the variable Y to be instantiated as NP.14 HOW- 
ever, the increased acceptability of related examples like the following sug- 
gests that the problem is not purely syntactic: 
(21) a. I will cook three, and eat two, potatoes. 
b. I want cooked, and he wants uncooked, potatoes. 
c. I will paint a picture of, and write a novel about, the potato. 
It rather seems to arise from the good sense or otherwise of the concept that 
arises in the interpretation of the composition across the NP boundary. In 
some of the derivations that follow, such a constraint will tacitly be assumed, 
without any particular commitment to where precisely in the grammar it 
arises.15 
Combinatory grammars also include type-raising rules, which turn argu- 
ments into functions over functions-over-such-arguments. These rules allow 
arguments to compose, and thereby take part in coordinations like I dislike, 
and Mary prefers, the corduroy. They too have an invariant compositional se- 
mantics corresponding to the combinator known to (some) combinatory logi- 
14Such a condition would follow automatically and without stipulation if the category 
N P  in determiners and other nominal categories were replaced throughout the lexicon by 
type-raised categories, as envisaged in the discussion of type raising below. 
15To the extent that this constraint does indeed arise from the conceptual anomaly of 
the interpretation associated with compositions like #[eat theIvplN in comparison with 
ones like [eat ~ W O ] ~ ~ / ~ ,  a theory like the present one which will actually provide such an 
interpretation via the composition rule may be more helpful than one which does not. Note 
that if the NP constraint is regarded as arising from lexical type raising, then exceptions 
like the above must be regarded as arising from further raising the VERB over the raised 
N P  category. 
cians as T, which ensures that the result has an appropriate interpretation.16 
For example, the following rule, indexed >T, allows the conjuncts to form as 
below (again, the remainder of the derivation is omitted): 
(22) Subject Type-raising: 
N P : x  + S/(S\NP) :XP [Px] 
(23) I d i s l i k e  and Mary prefers  . . . -------- --------- ---- -------- --------- 
NP (S\NP)/NP conj NP (S\NP)/NP 
-------- >T -------- >T 
S/ (S\NP) S/(S\NP) 
------------------ >B ------------------ >B 
S/NP S/NP 
There is an option here as to whether we consider type-raising to be an 
operation of active syntax, like composition, or as a rule of the lexicon or 
of morphology. In the latter case, of course, not only nominative NPs like 
I, but also uncased NPs like May, and even articles like the would have to 
bear additional categories like S/(S\NP), (S/(S\NP))/N, and so on. As 
far as the parser is concerned, it is likely that this alternative is desirable.17 
For present purposes, however, it makes no difference, and it is notationally 
less wearisome to think of type-raising as a syntactic rule, merely noting that 
the alternative exists. 
It will probably be obvious at this point that the addition of type rais- 
ing and composition to the theory of grammar immediately provides every- 
thing we need in order to account for leftward extractions in relative clauses, 
on the further assumption that relative pronouns bear a lexical category 
(N\N)/(S/NP) - a function from fragments like M a y  prefers into noun 
modifiers which is itself closely related to a type-raised category: 
16This combinator is also known as C , .  Again, the explicit semantics is purely 
mnemonic. 
''~t is also possible that the grammar itself may require this interpretation of type- 
raising - cf. [62]. 
(24) the corduroy that Mary prefers 
---- -------- ------------ -------- --------- 
N P / N  N ( N \ N )  / ( S / N P )  N P  ( S \ N P )  / N P  
------ > T 
S/ ( S \ N P )  ------------------ > B 
S / N P  
......................... > 
N\N ------------------ < 
N ---------------- < 
N P  
It should be similarly obvious that the theory immediately predicts that 
leftward and rightward extraction will be unbounded:ls 
(25) a. I think tha t  Mary prefers, and I know tha t  you dislike, corduroy 
b. The corduroy which I think tha t  Mary prefers 
The subject type-raising rule is a special case of a more general rule which 
can be written as follows: 
(26) Forward Type Raising: 
The symbol T is a (polymorphic) variable standing for any category that the 
grammar 
As in the case of the forward composition rule 18, such a free type-raising 
rule threatens to overgeneralise. For example, it potentially permits VPs to 
raise over adjunct categories, to allow derivations like the following: 
18See the earlier papers and [89] for details, including remarks concerning ECP and 
Coordinate Structure constraints, and on pied piping. 
lgThe generalised form of composition used in the other papers referred to here (see later 
footnote) allows grammars to include unboundedly many categories. However, as  Rooth 
and Partee [77], [65] pointed out within a different framework, there are some obvious 
ways of restricting type raising which eliminate this problem. The most obvious one is to  
adopt the tactic mentioned at a number of points above, of type raising nominal categories 
over a fixed set of categories in the lexicon, rather than in syntax. 
(27) ?I w i l l  buy, and go t o  bed without reading, your novel about t h e  potato 
------ ----- ---- ---------- --------------- ........................... 
S/VP VP/NP conj VP (VP\VP) /NP NP 
---------- >T 
VP/ (VP\VP) 
........................ >B 
VP/NP 
........................... <&> 
VP/NP 
Such examples are generally held to be unacceptable, and to violate the island 
status of adjuncts. They are certainly less acceptable than similar examples 
involving "parasitic" extraction, discussed in [83]: 
(28) 1 will buy, and burn without reading, your novel about the potato. 
However, the marginal acceptability of 27, and of related examples discussed 
by Chomsky [24, p. 721, as well as a number of other subjacency-related 
constraints, such as Ross's Complex NP constraint, suggests that what is 
wrong with 27 is again a matter of the good sense of the predicate go to 
bed without reading. In the examples that follow, appeal will be made to a 
parallel with similar constraints upon intonational constituents, without any 
commitment as to the source of such constraints. 
At this point, it is natural to ask what further rules are permitted by 
the theory, and whether the degrees of freedom that they imply are required 
elsewhere in the grammar of English and other languages. This question has 
been extensively discussed in [83], [85], where it is argued that the possible 
rules are limited by three Principles called Adjacency, Directional Consis- 
tency, and Directional Inheritance. The first of these simply amounts to the 
assumption that purely local combinatory rules, as opposed to long-range 
rules of movement, abstraction, or indexing over variables, will in fact do the 
job. The second principle, that of Directional Consistency, prohibits com- 
binatory rules which contradict the directional specifications of the lexicon, 
such as the following version of functional application: 
Finally, the Principle of Directional Inheritance forbids rules which change 
the directionality of an argument (such as Z in the following version of fun- 
tional composition) from the left-hand side to the right hand side of the 
rule: 
It is shown in the earlier papers that these three principles allow all and only 
the rules that are required to capture a wide range of generalisations con- 
cerning long-range dependency and coordination in a number of languages. 
On the above view, strings like Mary prefers and even a policeman a flower 
are constituents in the fullest sense of the term. It follows that they must 
also be possible constituents of non-coordinate sentences like Mary prefers 
corduroy, as in the following derivation: 
(31) Mary prefers corduroy 
-------- --------- -------- 
NP (S\NP)/NP NP 
-------- > T 
S/(S\NP) ------------------ >B 
S/NP 
------------------ > 
S 
The claim of the present section is simply that the exact surface structures 
that are induced by the combinatory account of coordination in English sub- 
sume the intonational structures that are postulated by Pierrehumbert et al. 
to explain the possible intonation contours for sentences of English. More 
specifically, the claim is that that in spoken utterance, intonation helps to 
determine which of the many possible bracketings permitted by the com- 
binatory syntax of English is intended, and that the interpretations of the 
constituents that arise from these derivations, far from being "spurious", 
are related to distinctions of discourse focus among the concepts and open 
propositions that the speaker has in mind. 
The proof of this claim lies in showing that the rules of combinatory 
grammar can be made sensitive to intonation contour, which limit their ap- 
plication in spoken discourse. We must also show that the major constituents 
of intonated utterances like 8b, under the analyses that are permitted by any 
given intonation, correspond to the information structure of the context to 
which the intonation is appropriate, as in (a) in the example 8 in section 3.2. 
This demonstration will be quite simple, once we have established a notation 
for intonation contours. 
75.1 INTONATION AND CONTEXT 
I shall use a notation which is based on the theory of Pierrehumbert [68], as 
modified in more recent work by Selkirk [78], Beckman and Pierrehumbert 
[7], [69], and Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg [70]. I have tried as far as pos- 
sible to take my examples and the associated intonational annotations from 
those authors. The theory proposed below is in principle compatible with 
any of the standard descriptive accounts of phrasal intonation. However, a 
crucial feature of Pierrehumbert's theory for present purposes is that it dis- 
tinguishes two subcomponents of the prosodic phrase, the pitch accent and 
the b0~ndar-y.~' The first of these tones or tone-sequences coincides with the 
perceived major stress or stresses of the prosodic phrase, while the second 
marks the righthand boundary of the phrase. These two components are 
essentially invariant, and all other parts of the intonational tune are inter- 
polated. Pierrehumbert's theory thus captures in a very natural way the 
intuition that the same tune can be spread over longer or shorter strings, in 
order to  mark the corresponding constituents for the particular distinction 
of focus and propositional attitude that the melody denotes. It will help 
the exposition to augment Pierrehumbert's notation with explicit prosodic 
phrase boundaries, using brackets. These do not change her theory in any 
way: all the information is implicit in the original notation. 
Consider for example the prosody of the sentence Mary prefers corduroy 
in the following pair of discourse settings, which are adapted from Jackendoff 
[50, pp. 2601: 
"1 am suppressing the distinction between the intonational phrase proper, and what 
Pierrehumbert and her colleagues call the "intermediate" phrase, which differ in respect 
of boundary tone-sequences. 
(32) Q: Well, what about the CORduroy? Who prefers THAT? 
A: (MARy ) (prefers CORduroy). 
H* L L+H* LH% 
(33) Q: Well, what about MARy? What does SHE prefer? 
A: (MARy prefers ) ( CORduro~). 
L+H* LH% H* LL% 
In these contexts, the main stressed syllables on both Mary and corduroy 
receive a pitch accent, but a different one. In the former example, 32, there is 
a prosodic phrase on Mary made up of the pitch accent which Pierrehumbert 
calls H*, immediately followed by an L boundary. There is another prosodic 
phrase having the pitch accent called L+H* on corduroy, preceded by null 
or interpolated tone on the words prefers, and immediately followed by a 
boundary which is written LH%. (I base these annotations on Pierrehumbert 
and Hirschberg's [70, ex. 331 discussion of a similar example.)21 In the second 
example 33 above, the two tunes are reversed: this time the tune with pitch 
accent L+H* and boundary LH% is spread across a prosodic phrase Mary 
prefers, while the other tune with pitch accent H* and boundary LL% is 
carried by the prosodic phrase corduroy (again starting with an interpolated 
or null tone).22 
The meaning that these tunes convey in these contexts is intuitively very 
obvious.23 As Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg point out, the latter tune seems 
to be used to mark some or all of that part of the sentence expressing in- 
formation that the speaker believes to be novel to the hearer. In traditional 
terms, it marks the "comment" - more precisely, what Halliday called the 
"rhemen. In contrast, the L+H* LH% tune seems to be used to mark some 
or all of that part of the sentence which expresses information which in tra- 
ditional terms is the "topic" - in Halliday's terms, the "themen. For present 
"We continue to gloss over Pierrehumbert's distinction between "intermediate" and 
"intonational" phrases. 
22The reason for notating the latter boundary as LL%, rather than L is again to do with 
the distinction between intonational and intermediate phrases. 
231 do not of course intend to  claim that these are the only meanings that these tunes 
can convey. 
purposes, a theme can be thought of as conveying what the speaker assumes 
to be the subject of mutual interest, and this particular tune marks a theme as 
novel to the conversation as a whole, and as standing in a contrastive relation 
to the previous theme. (If the theme is not novel in this sense, it receives 
no tone in Pierrehumbert's terms, and may even be left out a l t ~ g e t h e r . ) ~ ~  
Thus in 33, the L+H* LH% phrase including this accent is spread across 
the phrase Mary prefers.25 Similarly, in 32, the same tune is confined to the 
object of the open proposition prefers corduroy, because the intonation of the 
original question indicates that prefering corduroy as opposed to some other 
stu$ is the new topic or theme. 
It follows that the position of the pitch accent in the phrase has to do with 
a further orthogonal dimension of information structure within both theme 
and rheme, corresponding to the interesting bit of either information unit. 
It is tempting to call this part the LLfocus" of the theme or rheme, but I 
shall avoid the term and follow Halliday in calling it "new" information, in 
contrast to the "given" information accompanied by the null tone. The term 
"new" is perhaps not entirely satisfactory, but it is intended to suggest that 
the part of the theme that is marked in this way is new to the speaker, while 
the part of the rheme that is so marked is believed by the speaker to be new 
to the hearer. This usage is illustrated in the following example: 
(34) Q: I know that Mary's FIRST degree is in PHYSICS. 
But what is the subject of her DOCTORATE? 
A: (Mary's DOCTORATE) (is in CHEMISTRY) 
L+H* LH% H* LL% 
Given New Given New 
Theme Rheme 
Here the theme is Mary's doctorate, where the head noun is emphasised 
because it stands in contrast to another of her qualifications. The rheme is 
that it is in chemistry, where chemistry is emphasised in contrast to another 
subject . 
24Here I depart slightly from Halliday's definition. The present proposal also follows 
Lyons [56] in rejecting Halliday's claim that the theme must necessarily be sentence-initial. 
25An alternative prosody, in which the contrastive tune is confined to Mary, seems 
equally coherent, and may be the one intended by Jackendoff. I believe that this alternative 
is informationally distinct, and arises from an ambiguity as to whether the topic of this 
discourse is Mary or What Mary prefers. It too is accepted by the rules below. 
The L+H* LH% intonational melody in example 33 belongs to a phrase Mary 
prefers ... which corresponds under the combinatory theory of grammar to a 
grammatical constituent, complete with a translation equivalent to the open 
proposition Xx[(pre f er' x )  mar y'] introduced by the question in that example 
What does Mary prefer? The combinatory theory thus offers a way to derive 
such intonational phrases, using only the independently motivated rules of 
combinatory grammar, entirely under the control of appropriate intonation 
contours like L+H* LH%. 
In fact we might think of doing this in one of two ways. We might either 
think of annotating combinatory rules, for example imposing a restriction 
forbidding composition across an intonational phrase boundary. Or we might 
exploit the advantages of categorial grammar more directly, as  follow^.'^ 
We will begin by defining the two pitch accents as functions of the following 
types:27 
These categories define the two pitch accents as functions over boundary 
tones into the two major informational types, Theme and Rheme, where the 
latter category is itself a function from themes into utterances." In the 
case of the H* pitch accent, there are two categories, one combining with 
an intermediate phrase boundary to yield a forward category of the latter 
kind, the other combining with an intonational phrase boundary to yield a 
26This section is a summary of the proposals in [86] and [87]. 
2 7 ~ h e  following rules constitute a minor revision of [86], prompted by Steven Bird's 
[lo] observation of an overgeneralisation arising from the conflation of intonational and 
intermediate phrases in the earlier account. 
2"he choice of the rheme rather than the theme as the "head" of the prosodic utterance 
is to  some extent arbitrary, but is motivated by the observation that the rheme is the 
obligatory member of the pair. 
backward version. It will be convenient to refer to the backward and forward 
category collectively as "the rheme category". 
We define the various boundary tones as arguments to these functions, 
as follows:29 
Finally, we accomplish the effect of interpolation of other parts of the tune by 
assigning the following category to all elements bearing no tone specification, 
which we will represent as the null tone 
X is a category that can match any category, importantly including X/X.31 
It will therefore introduce a considerable amount of non-determinism to the 
prosodic side of the grammar. However, this will turn out to be strictly 
necessary: the null tone is very ambiguous in present terms. 
The prosodic combinatory rules include forward and backward functional 
application. They also include the following very restricted version of forward 
functional composition: 
(38) Forward Prosodic Functional Composition: 
X/Y Y/Z * X/Z 
where Y E {Bh, 31, b l )  
29An alternative grammar, which would be closer to Pierrehumbert & Beckman 1989, 
and which might also be more directly compatible with Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg's 
proposals for the compositional assembly of discourse meanings from more primitive ele- 
ments of meaning carried by each individual tone, would be obtained by assigning pitch 
accents the category of functions from phrasal tones into intermediate phrases marked as 
theme, rheme, etc, and assigning the boundary tones the category of functions from inter- 
mediate to intonational phrases, similarly marked. However, the precise details of such an 
alternative depend on some imponderables in the original theory concerning the precise 
position and nature of the phrasal tone itself (see Pierrehumbert & Beckman 1989:236-237 
and an earlier footnote). 
301 am grateful to Steven Bird for first suggesting a related category for the null tone. 
311n a unification-based realisation such as that sketched in Steedman 1990a, X would 
be realised as the equivalent of a unique Prolog variable, distinct from that in any other 
instance of the null tone. 
The restriction is required because the whole point of the prosodic categories 
is to PREVENT composition across the theme/rheme boundary. It will become 
apparent below that, given the categories chosen above, the only occasion on 
which composition is required is when X/Y is a pitch accent - that is, a 
function over a boundary. Another important consequence is that two null 
tones of type X/X can only combine by application, not composition. 
Syntactic combination can now be made subject to intonation contour by 
the following simple restriction: 
(39) THE PROSODIC CONSTITUENT CONDITION: combination of two 
syntactic categories via a syntactic combinatory rule is only allowed 
if their prosodic categories can also combine (and vice versa). 
(The prosodic and syntactic combinatory rules need not, and usually will 
not, be the same). 
This principle has the sole effect of excluding certain derivations for spo- 
ken utterances that would be allowed for the equivalent written sentences. 
For example, consider the derivations that it permits for example 33 above. 
The rule of forward composition is allowed to apply to the words Mary and 
ate, because the prosodic categories can combine (by functional application): 
(40) Mary prefers . . . 
L+H* LH% --------------- ----------------- 
NP : mary ' (S\NP)/NP:prefert 
Theme/Bh Bh 
------------------- >T 
S/ (S\NP) : \P [P mary 'I 
Theme/Bh 
..................................... >B 
S/NP: \X [(pref er' X) mary '1 
Theme 
The category X/X of the null tone allows intonational phrasal tunes like 
L+H* LH% tune to spread across any sequence that forms a grammatical 
constituent according to the combinatory grammar. For example, if the same 
question What does Mary prefer? evokes the response MARY says she prefers 
CORduroy, then the tune will typically be spread over Mary says she prefers 
... as in the following (incomplete) derivation, in which much of the syntactic 
and semantic detail has been omitted in the interests of brevity: 
(41) Mary says she prefers ... 
L+H* LH% 
-------->T -------- -------->T --------- 
S/(S\NP) (S\NP)/S S/(S\NP) (S\NP)/NP 
Theme/Bh X/X X/X Bh 
------------------- >B 
Theme/Bh 
......................... >B 
Theme/Bh 
.............................. >B 
Theme 
Such non-standard constituents, marked as Theme, can take part in such 
derivations as the following: 
(42) Mary prefers the green corduroy 
L+H* LH% H* LL% 
--------------- ----------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- 
NP : mary ' (S\NP)/NP:prefer' NP/N: they N/N:greeny N:corduroy3 
ThemelBh Bh X/X X/X Utterance\Theme ---------------- >T ....................... >B 
S/(S\NP) :\PEP mary'l NP/N:\Y [the' (greeny (Y))] 
Theme/Bh x/x 
.................................. >B ........................................ > 
S/NP : \X[(pref er ' X) mary '1 NP :the3 (green' corduroyy ) 
Theme Utterance\Theme 
.................................................................. > 
S: prefer' (the'(greeny corduroy')) mary' 
Utterance 
The division of the utterance into an open proposition constituting the theme 
and an argument constituting the rheme is appropriate to the context estab- 
lished in 33. Moreover, the theory permits no other division into a theme 
and a rheme for this intonation contour. 
All the other possibilities for combining these two contours in a simple 
sentence are shown elsewhere [86] to yield similarly unique and contextually 
appropriate interpretations. 
Sentences like the above, including marked theme and rheme expressed as 
two distinct intonational/intermediate phrases are by that token unambigu- 
ous as to their information structure. However, sentences like the following, 
which in Pierrehumbert's terms bear a single intonational phrase, are much 
more ambiguous as to the division that they convey between theme and 
rheme: 
(43) (I read a book about CORduroy) 
H* LL% 
Such a sentence is notoriously ambiguous as to the open proposition it presup- 
poses, for it seems equally appropriate as a response to any of the following 
questions: 
(44) a. What did you read a book about? 
b. What did you read? 
c. What did you do? 
Such questions could in suitably contrastive contexts give rise to themes 
marked by the L+H* LH% tune, bracketing the sentence as follows: 
(45) a. (I read a book about)(CORduroy) 
b. (I read)(a book about CORduroy) 
c. (I)(read a book about CORduroy) 
It seems that we shall miss a generalisation concerning the relation of intona- 
tion to discourse information unless we extend Pierrehumbert's theory very 
slightly, to  allow prosodic constituents resembling null intermediate phrases, 
without pitch accents, expressing unmarked themes. Since the boundaries 
of such intermediate phrases are not explicitly marked, we shall immediately 
allow all of the above analyses for 43. Such a modification to the theory 
can be introduced by the following rule, which nondeterministically allows 
constituents bearing the null tone to become a theme: 
(46) Nu11 Theme Promotion Rule: 
X/X Theme 
The rule is nondeterministic, so it correctly continues to  allow a further 
analysis of the entire sentence as a single Intonational Phrase conveying the 
Rheme. Such an utterance is the appropriate response to yet another open- 
proposition establishing question, W h a t  happened?. 
The grammar exemplified in the derivation 42, above, implicitly embodies 
an explanation of the second dimension of information structure identified 
above, Halliday's contrast between "given" and "new" information. The 
derivation that is given there for the rheme t h e  green corduroy is only one 
of two alternatives permitted by that intonation contour, represented by the 
following bracketings: 
(47) a. (the green)(CORduroy) 
b. (the) (green CORduroy) 
However, this ambiguity, like the ambiguity inherent in the null theme, is 
also a genuine one. The intonation contour in question does not distinguish 
between the information structures appropriate to responses to the following 
two questions: 
(48) a. Does Mary like the green corduroy or the green velvet? 
b. Does Mary like the green corduroy or the red velvet? 
That is, it does not distinguish whether green is part of the given or part of 
the new. This is a subtle ambiguity, but its reality is clear from the existence 
of the intonation contour exhibited in the following exchange, for which the 
grammar only permits the second of these derivations, a fact that is consistent 
with the intuition that here it is the entire N-phrase green corduroy  that is 
marked as being new and interesting: 
(49) Q. Does Mary like the green corduroy or the red cordurory? 
A. (MARY prefers)(the (GREEN corduroy)) 
It follows from this analysis that the related utterance with an unmarked 
theme is extremely ambiguous as to its information structure, since there are 
several ways of splitting it up into a theme and a rheme, and there may be 
several ways of further dividing each of these into given and new: 
(50) (Mary prefers the green CORDUROY). 
H* LL% 
However, this ambiguity appears to be correctly constrained by the grammar. 
That is, the following does not appear to be a possible information structure, 
any more than it is a possible syntactic structure. (Relativisation and Coor- 
dination reveal that the sentence is in violation of an NP constraint.) 
(51) * ( ~ a r ~  prefers the green)The,e(CORDUROY)Rheme 
With the generalisation implicit in the above rules, we are therefore in 
a position to claim that the structures demanded by the theory of intona- 
tion and its relation to contextual information are the same as the surface 
syntactic structures permitted by the combinatory grammar. Moreover, be- 
cause constructions like relativisation and coordination are more limited in 
the derivations they require, often forcing composition, rather than permit- 
ting it, it follows that anything which can coordinate can be an intonational 
constituent, and vice versa. It also follows that anything which can be the 
residue of relativisation can be an intonational constituent. These claims are 
discussed further in [86] and [87]. 
According to the theory sketched in this section, the pathway between 
phonological form and interpretation is much simpler than most recent phono- 
logical studies would suggest. Phonological form maps via the rules of com- 
binatory grammar directly onto a surface structure, whose highest level con- 
stituents correspond to intonational constituents, annotated as to their dis- 
course function. Surface structure therefore subsumes intonational structure. 
It also subsumes information structure, since the translations of those surface 
constituents correspond to the entities and open propositions which consti- 
tute the topic or theme (if any) and the comment or rheme. These in turn 
reduce via functional application to yield canonical function-argument struc- 
ture, or LLlogical form". 
There may be significant advantages for theories of processing in such a 
theory of grammar. Most obviously, where in the past parsing and phono- 
logical processing have tended to deliver conflicting structural analyses, and 
have had to be pursued independently, they now are seen to be in concert. 
That is not to say that intonational cues remove all local structural ambi- 
guity. Nor should the problem of recognising cues like boundary tones be 
underestimated, for the acoustic realisation in the fundamental frequency Fo 
of the intonational tunes discussed above is entirely dependent upon the rest 
of the phonology - that is, upon the phonemes and words that bear the tune. 
It therefore seems most unlikely that intonational contour can be identified 
in isolation from word re~ognition.~' 
32This is not necessarily a bad thing. The converse also applies: intonation contour 
effects the acoustic realisation of words, particularly with respect to timing. It is therefore 
likely that the benefits of combining intonational recognition and word recognition will be 
mutual. 
While the above account is necessarily brief, a number of properties of the 
combinatory theory of grammar should be clear at this point. In order to 
account for coordination, unbounded dependency, and intonational structure, 
strictly within the confines of the constituent condition on rules, we are 
forced to take a view of surface structure according to which strings like 
Mary prefers and thinks that Mary prefers are constituents in the fullest 
sense of the term. It follows that they must also be possible constituents 
of non-coordinate sentences like Mary prefers corduroy, and Harry thinks 
that Mary prefers corduroy. For moderately complex sentences there will in 
consequence be a large number of non-standard alternative derivations for 
any given reading.33 The nature of the combinatory rules guarantees that 
all such derivations deliver the same function argument relations as more 
traditional derivations (which are of course also allowed by the combinatory 
grammar). 
There is a temptation to reject this claim out of hand, on the grounds that 
it is a t  odds with much linguistic received opinion, and that if linguists know 
nothing else, they must know what a surface constituent is. However, the 
argument from authority does not stand up. On many tests for constituency, 
for example the list originally proposed by Chornsky and cited at  thge start 
of Part I, the combinatory theory does better than most. And other crite- 
ria for constituency, such as susceptibility to movement transformations, are 
confounded with semantic constituency, as Fodor e t  al. [33] have pointed 
out, an observation that merely underlines the wisdom of Chomsky's warn- 
ing against relying too much on intuitions about meaning in the pursuit of 
syntactic form. 
The temptation to reject the proposal on the basis of parsing consid- 
erations is similarly ill-found. We have already noted that the presence of 
such semantic equivalence classes of derivations engenders rather more non- 
determinism in the grammar than we may have been aware of. While this 
fact implies that problem of writing parsers is a little harder than we might 
have expected, it is clear that this non-determinism really is a property of 
33The interested reader is referred to  the earlier papers for further discussion, and to 
Weir and Joshi [94], Hepple and Morrill [45], and Vijay-Shankar and Weir [92] for results 
on parsing, automata-theoretic power and worst-case parsing complexity. 
the language, and will be encountered by any theory with the same coverage 
with respect to coordination and intonational structure. We may also note 
that natural grammars show no sign whatsoever of a pressure to minimise 
non-determinism elsewhere in the grammar. There is therefore no reason 
whatsoever to doubt the competence theory on these grounds. 
The only conclusion that we can draw from this grammatical non-determinism 
is that the mechanism for coping with it must be very powerful. The next 
part of the paper will argue that the most important device for dealing with 
non-determinism in the human processor is a process of eliminating partial 
analyses whose interpretation is inconsistent with the discourse context. The 
paper will also claim that combinatory grammars are particularly suited to 
the use of this tactic. 
All language processors can be viewed as made up of three elements. The 
first is a grammar, which defines how constituents combine to yield other 
constituents. The second is a non-deterministic algorithm for applying the 
rules of the grammar to a string. The third is an oracle, or mechanism for 
resolving non-determini~m.~~ The oracle decides which rule of grammar to 
apply a t  points in the analysis where the non-deterministic algorithm allows 
more than one rule to  apply. The following sections discuss these elements 
in turn. 
The strong competence hypothesis as originally stated by Bresnan and Ka- 
plan assumes that the grammar that is used by or implicit in the human 
sentence processor is the competence grammar itself. It is important to be 
clear that this is an assumption, not a logical requirement. The proces- 
sors that we design ourselves (such as compilers for programming languages) 
quite often do not exhibit this property. There is no logical necessity for the 
structures involved in processing a programming language to have anything 
to do with the structures that are implicated by its competence grammar - 
34The division of labour in processing between a non-deterministic algorithm and and 
an oracle is not always made, particularly in implen~entations. However, all processors 
can be viewed in this way. 
that is, the syntactic rules in the reference manual that are associated with 
its semantics. The compiler or interpreter can parse according to a quite 
different grammar, provided that there exists a computable homomorphism 
mapping the structures of this "covering grammarn onto the structures of 
the competence grammar. If the homomorphism is simple, so that the com- 
putational costs of parsing according to the covering grammar plus the costs 
of computing the mapping are less than the costs of parsing according to the 
competence grammar, than there may be a significant practical advantage in 
this strategem. For this reason, it is quite common for compilers and inter- 
preters to  parse according to a weakly equivalent covering grammar, mapping 
to the "real" grammar via a homomorphism under concatenation on a string 
representing the derivation under the covering grammar. For example, the 
strategem tends to  be used in programming language compilers, when a pars- 
ing algorithm that is desirable for reasons of efficiency demands grammars in 
a normal form that is not adhered to by the grammar in the reference manual 
(cf. Gray and Harrison [41], and Nijholt [63]). Such a situation also arises in 
artificial parsers for natural languages, when it is desired to use a top-down 
or table-driven algorithm which is ill-suited to the left recursive rules which 
commonly occur in natural grammars (cf. Kuno [54] for an early example). 
As Berwick and Weinberg [8, esp. p.78-821 have noted, there is therefore 
no logical necessity for the structures involved in human natural language 
processing to have anything to do with the structures that are implicated by 
its competence grammar. 
Nevertheless, similar considerations of parsimony in the theory of lan- 
guage evolution and language development to those invoked earlier might 
also lead us to expect that, as a matter of fact, a close relation will turn out 
to hold between the competence grammar and the structures dealt with by 
the psychological processor, and that it will in fact incorporate the compe- 
tence grammar in a modular fashion. One reason that has been frequently 
invoked is that language development in children is extremely fast. This 
speed suggests that it proceeds via the piecemeal addition, substitution and 
modification of individual rules and categories of competence grammar. Any 
addition of, or change to, a rule of competence grammar will not in general 
correspond to a similarly modular change in a covering grammar. Instead, 
the entire ensemble of competence rules will typically have to be recompiled 
into a new covering grammar. Even if we assume that the transformation 
of one grammar into another is determined by a language-independent al- 
gorithm, and can be computed each time at negligable cost, we have still 
sacrificed parsimony in the theory, and increased the burden of explanation 
on the theory of evolution. In particular, it is quite unclear why the develop- 
ment of either of the principal components of the theory in isolation should 
confer any selective advantage. The competence grammar is by assumption 
unprocessable, and the covering grammar is by assumption uninterpretable. 
It looks as though they can only evolve as a unified system, together with the 
translation process. The evolution of such a system is likely to be harder to 
explain than that of a more directly competence-based system. Indeed the 
first thing we would have to explain is why a covering grammar was necessary 
in the first place. The reference grammars of programming languages and the 
competence grammars of natural languages have syntaxes that are ill-suited 
to parsing with our favourite algorithms because they are constrained from 
outside by our own requirements. It is we who find Greibach Normal Form 
tedious, and find grammars with left recursive rules congenial, forcing the use 
of covering grammars by some artificial processors. It is quite unclear what 
comparable external force could have the effect of making natural grammars 
similarly ill-matched to the natural sentence processor.35 
It is important to note that the strong competence hypothesis as stated 
3 5 ~ h a t  processor might conceivably require grammars to be in some normal form. How- 
ever, provided that the normal form is a class of grammars of the same automata-theoretic 
power that the semantics of the language requires (and therefore of the same power as the 
competence grammar), we would expect that normal form to simply be a characteristic of 
the grammars we observe. In other words, we would view it as a (processing-based) con- 
straint on the form of the competence grammars that actually exist. If on the other hand 
we are to entertain the possibility that the requirement for a covering grammar might 
arise from the fact that the mechanisms that have access to the outside world are for 
some reason of a lesser automata-theoretic power than the competence grammar, then the 
evolutionary claims become even more far-fetched. It  seems inevitable that the mapping 
between analyses under the two grammars must become more complex. The problem of 
incremental language learning becomes correspondingly more complex. So of course does 
the problem mentioned above, of evolving the two systems in lock step. Indeed, we have 
to ask ourselves how these two systems which by assumption have completely different 
automata-theoretic character could begin to talk to one another in the first place. We 
have to ask ourselves whether it would not be simpler for evolution t o  bring the proces- 
sor more in line with the requirements of competence grammar - after all, it has already 
come up with such a mechanism once, in the form of the interpreter for the competence 
semantics. 
by Bresnan and Kaplan imposes no further constraint on the processor. In 
particular it does not limit the structures built by the processor to fully 
instantiated constituents. However, the present paper proposes a "strictn 
version of the competence hypothesis, which imposes this further ~ o n d i t i o n . ~ ~  
The reasoning behind this strict version is again evolutionary. If in order to 
process sentences we need more than the grammar itself, even a perfectly 
general "compiler" that turns grammars into algorithms dealing in other 
structures, then the load on evolution is increased. Similar arguments for 
the need for the grammar and processor to evolve in lockstep mean that a 
theory that keeps such extras to the minimum wins. 
This version of the competence hypothesis has the effect of generalising 
the constituent condition to cover the processor. The claim is that the con- 
stituents that are recognised in the grammar (and their interpretations) will 
be the only structures that the processor will give evidence of. Anything else 
whatsoever that we are forced to postulate is an extra assumption, and will 
require an independent explanation if it is not to count against the theory. 
Of course, such an explanation may be forthcoming. Almost no-one would 
think it a shortcoming to have to postulate a language-independent mecha- 
nisms to map grammar rules onto Earley-style dotted rules. Such a mech- 
anism might plausibly have been independently evolved for other functions 
involving hierarchical control. The postulation of the apparently more spe- 
cial purpose table-driven LR parsing mechanism would presumably be seen 
by most people as a more serious violation of this strict condition upon the 
second component of the processor, the non-deterministic algorithm, which 
we will examine next. 
If we believe that the natural processor must incorporate the competence 
grammar directly, what more must it include? According to the assumptions 
with which this section began, it must include a non-deterministic algorithm 
that will apply the rules of the grammar to accept or reject the string, to- 
gether with some extra apparatus for simultaneously building a structure 
3 6 ~ h i s  tronger condition is somewhat unhelpfully referred to in Steedman [84] simply 
as "the strong competence hypothesis". The version defined there and above is stricter 
than Bresnan and Kaplan's version. 
representing its analysis. Provided that the competence grammar is monos- 
tratal and monotonic, this structure can be the semantic translation itself, 
rather than a strictly syntactic structure. Under this view, (which has been 
commonplace in computational linguistics since the ATN), a syntactic deriva- 
tion is simply a trace of the way in which this interpretable structure was 
built. 
The processor must also include an oracle (dealt with in the next sub- 
section) to resolve non-determinism in the grammar for the algorithm. A 
theory will be successful to the extent that both of these components can be 
kept as minimal and as language-independent as possible. For this reason, 
we should be very careful to exclude the possibility that either the algorithm 
or the oracle covertly embeds rules of a grammar other than the competence 
grammar. 
There are of course a great many algorithms for any given theory of gram- 
mar. The alternatives most commonly proposed by computational linguists 
either work top-down and depth-first through the rules of the grammar, or 
work bottom-up from the string via the rules, or employ some mixture of 
the two. For obvious reasons, all such algorithms usually work from the ear- 
liest elements of the sentence to the last, or (for the present orthography) 
leftmost-first. 
Such algorithms require (at least) a store, in addition to the competence 
grammar and a mechanism for eliminating non-determinism. The nature of 
this store depends upon the automata-theoretic class of the grammar. For 
context-free grammars it is a push-down store, or stack. For the classes of 
grammars we shall deal with below, it is a generalisation of the same device. 
The question that we must ask under the strict competence hypothesis is, 
how little more can we get away with? In particular, can we get away with 
nothing more than the theoretical minimum? That is, the stack, plus a 
control which does nothing except apply rules of grammar to the string and 
the stack, subject to the adjudication of the oracle, and dealing in no other 
structures whatever. 
It has frequently been observed that the competence hypothesis in this 
strict form, under which the processor is allowed the absolute minimum of 
rules and structures in addition to those already implicit in the grammar, 
seems to favour bottom up-processing, for two reasons. The first reason is 
that (leftmost-first) top-down processors need extra modifications in order 
to deal with (left-)recursive rules, which are abundant in natural languages 
in the form of adjunction const ructions, which engender non-terminating 
recursion in the processor.37 There are two basic ways of dealing with the 
problem. One is to add special watchdogs that detect and interrupt endless 
loops. The other is to use a covering grammar, as discussed above. Both 
tactics require further assumptions and thus place a greater burden upon the 
evolutionary account. Hence, in the absence of any further information, the 
top-down processor seems more costly in evolutionary terms than the bottom 
up processor, which works for all grammars. 
The second reason for favouring bottom-up processing is that the bottom- 
up parser essentially requires nothing more than the minimal automaton 
that the grammar requires in automata theoretic terms. In the context-free 
case, this is a simple push-down stack. By assumption, each syntactic rule is 
paired with a semantic rule defining the interpretation of the parent category 
in terms of those of the offspring categories. We have also noted that a 
processor can perfectly well yield such an interpretation in lieu of traditional 
syntactic structure. It follows that we need add no more than a mechanism 
(such as term unification) to do the equivalent of binding variables. For 
example, consider a left-to-right bot tom-up analysis of the sentence Thieves 
love watches according to the following context free grammar: 
(52)  S :pred subj -, N P  : subj V P  : pred 
V P  : verb obj + V : verb N P  : obj 
(The colons associate syntactic categories with their semantic translations). 
The minimal non-deterministic algorithm says that the parser can either 
"shift" words from the string to the stack, with their grammatical category 
showing, or "reduce" the topmost items on the stack according to one of the 
rules of the grammar, replacing those items by the entity specified on the 
left-hand-side of the rule. This algorithm allows an analysis in which three 
successive shifts first results in stack in a, below: 
370f course, rightmost-first top-down processors are vulnerable to the even more preva- 
lent right-recursive constructions. 
I S : love' watches' thieves' I 
The top two items can then reduce via the second rule of the grammar 52, 
and be replaced by a VP love watches, as in b, whereupon the top two items 
can reduce to an S. 
By contrast, a top-down parser needs a little more in order to  analyse 
this sentence according to the same grammar. This is easiest to see by first 
considering the recogniser in isolation, then seeing how it would use the same 
trick of building an interpretation structure directly. In mid analysis, after 
the words thieves love have been encountered, the recogniser's stack must 
hold information specifying the control structure, or history of recursive rule 
invocations, as opposed to the simple stack of complete constituents used by 
the bottom up processor. That is to say that the stack must contain a note 
of all incomplete categories of which the verb love is an element, together 
with a note of what further categories are predicted by the non-deterministic 
algorithm to occur in the rest of the string for the completion of each one. We 
might represent this information as follows, following Earley-style notation 
and writing X.Y to mean "we need a Y to complete this X": 
We can augment this recogniser in order to make it build structures, using the 
same mechanism as before for building interpretation structures via graph 
unification. Then the control stack at  the same point will look like this: 
It is easy to see that once we accept a further object, N P  : watches', the vari- 
able x can be bound, and the VP will be completed as V P  : love' watches'. 
This in turn can be used to bind the variable pred and popped from the 
stack, yielding the same result, S : love' watches' thieves'. 
To accomplish this result, we have had to add more apparatus than we 
needed for the bottom-up algorithm. The entities on the control stack were 
not confined to grammatical constituents. We needed some extra apparatus 
to  derive entities like S.VP from rules like those in 52, and to manipulate 
them during a derivation. Indeed, such entities seem suspiciously akin to  
new structures or grammatical categories, which we might think of as "an 
S lacking a VP", that is, the function from V P  to S that in categorial 
grammar would be recognised as the type-raised category S/(S\ NP) .  The 
structures that the processor deals in are no longer limited to the constituents 
licensed by the grammar, and require an extra mechanism to derive them 
from that grammar. The bottom-up algorithm appears somewhat less costly 
in evolutionary terms. 
We noted earlier that the addition of such a mechanism is a particularly 
harmless violation of strict competence. A similar kind of mechanism could 
concievably have evolved for other ends, such as the hierarchical control of 
planned  action^.^' In this sense, the earlier problem of recursive rules is a 
more telling reason for rejecting the top-down alternative. 
In other respects, as Kimball[53] and Frazier and Fodor [37] have pointed 
out, the details of real grammars do not seem to be as one would expect from 
grammars designed for use with a (leftmost-first) bottom-up parser, under 
the strict competence assumption. All left most-first processors, when faced 
with right-branching constructions must, as the previous examples illustrate, 
simply put things on the stack until the constituent on the right branch is 
complete. However, the top-down algorithm is predictive in nature. When 
the lexically ambiguous word watches is encountered, this algorithm can be 
regarded as predicting an NP, via the stacked category VP. N P ,  a VP "look- 
ing for" an NP. Since no analysis permitted by the non-deterministic algo- 
rithm and the grammar predicts an intransitive verb at  this point in the 
string, the verb watches can be ignored. In particular, the fact that this verb 
can potentially combine with the previous word love (which could be an NP) 
to yield an S is ignored, since that S is not predicted by the grammar either. 
3"0f course, the inverse claim, that planning is parasitic upon the language faculty, 
would be equally (if not more) plausible. 
The bottom up algorithm, by contrast, is not predictive in this way. Both 
analyses of the substring love watches are accepted by the non-deterministic 
algorithm. This property threatens to make the job of the oracle harder, 
since there is a danger of building many structures which play no part in any 
successful analysis. Unlike the earlier observations concerning the mismatch 
between (leftmost-first) top-down parsing and left branching, this is not a 
problem for the algorithm itself, but for the mechanism that copes with non- 
determinism, so we will delay further discussion of the problem until after 
some preliminaries in the next section. 
86.3 AMBIGUITY AND NON-DETERMINISM 
Nothing about the expected close relation between syntax and semantics 
entails that the mapping should be unambiguous, despite the fact that the 
grammars for artificial languages we design ourselves typically permit only 
the most local of nondeterminism, because they are designed for use as formal 
calculi. Expressions in natural languages seem to be remarkably free with 
ambiguity, both of the global and local variety, as in the following famous 
examples; 
(56) Flying planes can be dangerous 
(57) a. Have the students taken the exam? 
b. Have the  students take the exam! 
In the latter example, from Marcus [57], the substring have the students 
is (syntactically and semantically) locally ambiguous, in the sense that a 
processor cannot immediately know which rule of grammar to apply after 
encountering the words have the students. Human beings seem to be remark- 
ably adept at resolving such ambiguities, which are astonishingly profuse in 
natural lang~age.~'  
Probably for the same reason, we do as a matter of fact tend to design our 
artificial languages in ways which make their symbols "locally" ambiguous, 
39This profusion of ambiguity in fact seems to suggest that there is a pressure to keep 
the lexicon small by comparison with the number of elementary concepts. Such a pressure 
could reflect a need to keep spoken words from taking too long to utter, in comparison to 
the accompanying thought processes. 
either in terms of which rule of syntax should apply, or in terms of which 
rule of semantics should apply. (An example of the latter is the "overload- 
ing" of an operator like + to denote distinct operations applying to integers, 
reals and complex numbers.) The one lesson that we can derive from our 
experience with artificial languages and processors like compilers is that such 
ambiguities must be resolvable quickly and locally if the computational com- 
plexity of processing is t o  be contained. 
In order to facilitate this requirement, programming languages are invari- 
ably carefully designed so that local ambiguity can be resolved immediately, 
either syntactically by examining the next symbol in the string, or semanti- 
cally by examining the types of functions and arguments (as in the case of 
overloading above). However, natural language shows no sign of any such 
constraint from within grammar. For example, while the locally ambiguous 
substring Have the students . . . in the above example is disambiguated by 
the next word take/taken, an indefinite amount of further linguistic material 
may intervene between the ambiguous substring and the dismbiguating in- 
formation, as when the sentences begin Have the students who were late with 
the homework . . . , Have the students who were late with the homework that I 
set last Monday . . . , and so on. This apparent non-determinism in the gram- 
mar is an anomaly that requires some further explanation, for if we allow 
the ambiguities to proliferate, then the costs of maintaining the alternatives 
will explode. Indeed, as Marcus points out, we must be able to eliminate 
all but some bounded number of alternative paths, on the basis of purely 
local evidence, since there is no evidence that processing load increases as a 
worse than linear function of sentence length. We will call the device that 
eliminates non-determinism, and decrees which rule of the grammar should 
be invoked at any point in the derivation, an "oracle". However this device 
works, it is clear that it must be very effective in order to deal with the degree 
of non-determinism that natural grammars exhibit. Moreover, as noted ear- 
lier, it must also be entirely language-independent, if it is not to compromise 
the parsimony and modularity of the theory of the processor. 
Most existing accounts of the human sentence processing mechanism have 
assumed that local ambiguity resolution is based on structural criteria, such 
as parsing "strategies" (Fodor et al. [33]; Kimball [53]), structural preferences 
(Frazier, [35]), rule orderings (Wanner [93]); lexical preferences (Ford et al. 
[34]), or lookahead (Marcus [57]). Such accounts have been claimed to explain 
a wide range of sentence processing phenomena, the most spectacular of 
which is undoubtedly the identification by Bever [9] of the "garden path 
phenomenon" - that is, the existence of a sentences like the following, for 
which a local ambiguity is mis-resolved in a way that makes a perfectly 
grammatical sentence unanalysable: 
(58) The horse raced past the barn fell 
However, such accounts have generally been characterised either by empirical 
shortcomings or by proliferation of devices and degrees of freedom in the 
theory (see for example the exchange between Frazier and Fodor and Wanner 
in [37], [93]). In particular, since the earliest stages of the work, it has been 
clear that all phenomena to do with human parsing were extremely sensitive 
to the influence of semantics and especially referential context. Bever himself 
noted a difference in the strength of the garden path effect in minimal pairs 
of sentences analogous to the following, an effect which he attributed to the 
differing pragmatic plausibility of analysing the initial noun phrases as a 
subject of the ambiguous verb/participle sent:40 
(59) a. The doctor sent for the patient arrived 
b. The flowers sent for the patient arrived 
There were a number of computational proposals for how this effect might 
work according to a LLweak" interaction between syntax and semantics, via 
a filtering process of comparing rival partial analyses on the basis of their 
success or failure in referring to entities in the model or discourse context 
(cf. Winograd [96]). In particular Crain et al. [27] and Altmann et al. 
[4] proposed a criterion for selecting among analyses called the Principle of 
Parsimony, which can be stated as follows: 
(60) T H E  PRINCIPLE OF PARSIMONY: the analysis whose interpretation 
carries fewest unsatisfied presuppositions will be preferred. 
These authors use the term "presupposition" in the "pragmatic" sense of 
Stalnaker and Lewis, and explain this principle in terms of the associated 
401 owe this modification of Bever's original example to Michael Niv. 
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notion of "accomodation" of unsatisfied presuppositions. They point out 
that the two analyses of sentence 58 as beginning with a simple NP t h e  horse 
and a complex NP t he  horse raced past the  barn differ in the number of horses 
that are presupposed to exist in the model, and in whether it is presupposed 
(via the modifier) that some agent raced one of them. They argue that 
contexts which because of previous mention of a horse, or some horses and 
some racing, already support one or the other set of presuppositions will 
favour the related analysis at the point of ambiguity, and thereby either 
induce or eliminate the garden path for this sentence under the principle 
of parsimony. Crucially, they also argue that the empty context, in which 
n o  horses and no racing have been mentioned, will favour the simplex NP 
analysis, because it carries fewer presuppositions, and is therefore easiest to 
accomodate. The principle accordingly predicts a garden path in the empty 
context. 
The vast majority of early psycholinguistic experiments have used empty 
contexts, and therefore failed to control adequately for this effect. However, 
experiments by Carroll e t  al. ([I 8]), Tannenhaus ([go]), Marslen- Wilson e t  
al. ([59]), Crain et al. [27]), and Altmann e t  al. ([3], [4]) have produced 
growing evidence that effects of semantics, and especially of referential con- 
text, are extremely strong. Indeed it is now the case that all theories of 
performance admit some such component, in the form of a "thematic pro- 
cessor" (cf. Frazier [36]) or the equivalent, and th.e only question is whether 
anything else besides this potentially very powerful source of ambiguity res- 
olution is actually required. (See the exchange between [26] and [88]). For, if 
interpretations are available at every turn in sentence processing, then there 
is every reason to suppose that the local syntactic ambiguities which abound 
in natural language sentences may be resolved by taking into account the ap- 
propriateness to the context of utterance of those interpretations, even when 
the rival analyses are in traditional terms incomplete. Indeed, the possibility 
that human language processors are able to draw on the information implicit 
in the context or discourse model seems to offer the only mechanism powerful 
enough to handle the astonishing profusion of local and global ambiguities 
that human languages allow, and to explain the fact that human language 
users are so rarely aware of them. Such a selective or "weak" interaction be- 
tween syntactic processing and semantic interpretation is entirely modular, 
as Fodor has pointed out ([32, pp.78,135]). 
If interpretation in context is the basis of local ambiguity resolution, 
then a number of further properties of the parser follow. The felicity of 
an interpretation with respect to a context is not an all-or-none property, 
comparable to syntactic well-formedness. Utterances are often surprising - 
indeed, they are infelicitous if they are not at least somewhat novel in content. 
I t  follows that evaluation in context can only yield information about the 
relative good fit of various alternatives. We should therefore expect the 
parser to use a tactic known as "beam-search", whereby at a point of local 
ambiguity, all alternative analyses permitted by the grammar are proposed 
in parallel. The associated interpretations are then evaluated in parallel, 
readings that fail to refer or are otherwise implausible being discarded or 
disfavoured in favour of others that are consistent with what is known, along 
the lines suggested earlier. The parsing process then proceeds with the best 
candidate(s), all others being discarded or interrupted. 
On the assumption that the number of alternative analyses that can be 
maintained at any one time is strictly limited, we can also assume that the 
process of semantic filtering occurs very soon after the alternatives are pro- 
posed. It should at least be completed before the next point of local am- 
biguity, for otherwise we shall incur the penalties of exponential growth in 
the number of analyses. Given the degree of non-determinism characteristic 
of natural grammars, this means that the interplay of syntactic analysis and 
semantic adjudication must be extremely intimate and fine-grained. Since 
most words are ambiguous, semantic adjudication will probably be needed 
almost word-by-word. 
For example, consider example 59, repeated here: 
(61) a. The doctor sent for the patient arrived 
b. The flowers sent for the patient arrived 
The garden path effect in a is reduced in b, because flowers, unlike doctors, 
cannot send for things. The very existence of a garden path effect in a sug- 
gests that this knowledge must be available early. If the processor were able 
to delay commit tment until the end of the putative clause the Bowers sent for 
the patient, then it would have got to the point of syntactic disambiguation 
by the main verb, and there would be no reason not to expect it to be able 
to recover from the garden path. It follows that to explain the lack of such 
an effect in b, we must suppose that the interpretation of the incomplete 
proposition the powers sent . . . must be available in advance of processing 
the PP, and that it is the fact that it has no extension that causes the garden 
path analysis to be aborted. 
However, the proposal to resolve non-determinism by appeal to such in- 
terpretations immediately appears to lead to a paradox. If the processor 
resolves non-determinism in mid-sentence, more or less word by word, on 
the basis of contextual appropriateness of interpretations, then those inter- 
pretations must be available in mid-sentence, also more or less word-by- 
word. However, under the rule-to-rule hypothesis and the strict version of 
the competence hypothesis, only constituents have interpretations, and only 
constituents are available to the processor. Now, there is no particular prob- 
lem about constructing a grammar according to which every leftmost string 
is a constituent, so that processing can proceed in this fashion incremen- 
tal processor. Any left-branching grammar provides an example. For such 
grammars, the assumption of a rule-to-rule compositional semantics means 
that, for each terminal in a left-to-right pass through the string, as soon as it 
is syntactically incorporated into a phrase, the interpretation of that phrase 
can be provided. And since the interpretation is complete, it may also be 
evaluated - for example, if the constituent is a noun or a noun phrase, then 
its extension or referent may be found. 
A right-branching CF grammar, on the other hand, does not have this 
property for left-to-right processors: In the absence of some further appa- 
ratus going beyond rule-to-rule processing and rule-to-rule semantics, all 
comprehension must wait until the end of the string, when the first com- 
plete constituent is built, and can be interpreted. Until that point, any 
processor which adheres to the strict competence hypothesis must simply 
pile up constituents on the stack. It therefore seems that we should expect 
the languages of the world to favour left branching constructions, at least 
wherever incremental interpretation is important for purposes of resolving 
non-determinism. However, the languages of the world make extravagant 
use of right-branching constructions - the crucial clause in 61, The powers 
sent for the patient, being a case in point. The availability of an interpreta- 
tion for what is in traditional terms not a constituent, namely The powers 
sent . . . therefore contradicts the strict competence hypothesis. 
In this connection, it is interesting that the combinatory theory makes 
such fragments as The doctor/flowers sent available in the competence gram- 
mar as constituents, complete with an interpretation, and comparable in ev- 
ery way to more traditional constituents like the clause and the predicate. To 
the extent that the empirical evidence, say from the experimental compari- 
son of the garden path effect in minimal pairs of sentences like 61, leads us to 
believe that interpretations are available to the processor for such fragments, 
it follows that the present theory of grammar gives rise to a simpler account 
of the processor, without compromising the strict version of the strong com- 
petence hypothesis. 
It is important to be clear that this problem for traditional right-branching 
grammars is independent of the parsing algorithm, and applies to bottom-up 
and top-down algorithms alike, so long as they adhere to the strict compe- 
tence hypothesis. The top-down algorithm still has the apparent advantage 
of being syntactically predictive, as we noted earlier, following Kimball [53] 
and Frazier and Fodor [37].41 However, neither algorithm of itself will al- 
low an interpretation to be accessed for the leftmost substring, in advance of 
them being combined into a constituent. Therefore neither algorithm unaided 
will allow semantic filtering as a basis for the oracle within right-branching 
constructions. 
To say this much is not of course to deny that incremental interpreta- 
tion is possible for right-branching grammars if they do not adhere to the 
strict competence hypothesis in this extreme form. Pulman [74, p.212-2131 
proposes a bottom-up shift reduce processor which includes a rule ("Clear") 
that collapses stacked dotted categories such as a subject the flowers and a 
4 1 ~ h e  usual response to this problem is to incorporate some top-down information in 
a basically bottom up algorithm. Kay [52] has proposed to do this via "reachability 
tables". Alternatives are LR and "left-corner" parsing. Such devices of course constitute 
more or less serious violations of the strict version of the strong competence hypothesis. 
However, it is worth noting that the combinatory grammar advocated in Part I can be 
seen as embedding a certain amount of this information in the grammatical categories 
themselves. For example, a type raised subject S/(S\NP) expresses the fact it is the left 
corner of an S, and that S is "reachable" from it. Resnik 1751 has pointed out that the 
addition of functional composition to such parsers, either in a left corner parser following 
Pulman 1741, or by implication in the grammar, may have certain desirable effects upon 
short-term memory requirements for the parser. 
potential complement-taking verb sent, 
1 S:send-for' x flowers' .PP x I 
However, this operation is clearly nothing more than functional composition. 
The theory sketched in Part I proposes such an operation as a component of 
competence grammar. It therefore predicts this operation in the processor, 
even under the strict competence hypothesis, rather than requiring it as an 
extra stipulation and thereby violating strict competence.43 
Similarly, we can make the earlier sketch of a top-down (non-deterministic) 
parsing algorithm incrementally interpretive by unifying semantic terms on 
the stack in advance of syntactic combination, yielding the following state for 
the control stack after the words The flowers sent have been encountered in 
the example, thereby potentially making available the partially interpreted 
category S:send-for' s flowers', which might be used by some computational 
demon or watchdog to reject the analysis on the basis of violating a selectional 
restriction: 
VP:send-for' x . PP:x 
S:send-for' x flowers' . VP:send-for' x 
Again, this operation amounts to stipulating composition as a rule of the 
processor, this time in the semantics. The selection restriction-detecting 
demon is also clearly in violation of strict competence hypothesis. 
There is in fact no sense in which a parser using a right-branching gram- 
mar under strict competence could conceivably access interpretations for 
substrings that are not constituents. To be absolutely clear that this is 
the case let us suppose that we parse with a pure categorial grammar, and 
are therefore given lexical type-raising, so that NPs can be paired with se- 
mantic roles in the proposition. Let us consider the question of whether the 
anomaly of the active verb sense of the flowers sent . . . can be detected in 
advance of processing to the patient. Let us assume a context that contains 
42The notation is adapted. 
43Pulman also has type-raising as  a rule of processing, under the name "Invoke". See 
Haddock [43], [44] for proposals for a more realistic incremental semantics than the toy 
version assumed here. 
exactly two propositions, namely that a doctor sent some flowers to a pa- 
tient (say send - for' flowers' patient' doctor'), and the flowers smelt nice 
(smell' nice' flowers'). Imagine that the parser is the simplest bottom-up 
parser, that must entertain all possible categories for the N P  the flowers, and 
that there are just three of these, the categories corresponding to a subject 
and an object, and the category involved in the modifier analysis that will 
ultimately succeed, if the garden path can be avoided. 
For each of these categories, a processor could without violating strict 
competence find all possible predications over the referent that are supported 
by the database, and associate that set with the category, as a constraint 
upon its interpretation. Since NPs are type-raised categories, we can restrict 
this set to predications of a particular theta-role. If this set is empty, the 
processor could concievably use this information to suspend further investi- 
gations of this path.44 This much would be entirely in keeping with the strict 
competence hypothesis, since we have dealt in nothing but grammatical con- 
stituents. 
However, it is not going to help us to detect the anomaly of the spurious 
sentence #The flowers sent for the patient in the example 61b before the end 
of the clause, thereby escaping the garden path. The set of propositions that 
are compatible with the flowers as a subject includes smell" nice' flowers' 
and nothing else. This set might conceivably be viewed as a constraint on 
possible outcomes of the parse on this path.45 Similarly, the path that starts 
with the assumption that the flowers is an object contains the single propo- 
sition send - for' flowers' patient' doctor'. (This latter path will not in fact 
440f course, to  say that the detection of anomaly amounts to no more than the absence 
of an extension in the discourse model is a caricature. In real life, it is considered rather 
bad form for an utterance to provide no novel information. A more realistic example would 
have to allow for the accomodation of novel predications into the model, in which case no 
strong conclusion could be drawn from the mere absence of a compatible extension as yet. 
Nevertheless, on occasion the context may in fact rule out all available analyses, causing 
an analysis to fail early, in advance of sentence internal disambiguating material. The 
possibility of such premature interrupts does mean that we can never rule out any theory 
of competence grammar from mere pycholinguistic evidence of access to interpretations. 
However, the primacy of competence over performance is not at issue. 
45Again, this is a caricature. We certainly cannot assume that the actual sentence will 
correspond to the fact we already know - in fact, we ought to be able to assume the 
reverse, if our interlocutor is being cooperative. 
yield even a syntactic analysis corresponding to this proposition, of course). 
When the word sent is processed, it is similarly conceivable that we may 
notice that the model supports a single proposition concerning this relation, 
which for the sake of argument, we will again allow ourselves to regard as 
some kind of constraint on possible outcomes. However, we can do nothing 
further whatsoever with the information we have associated with the putative 
subject and the verb without vioIating strict competence. If we were allowed 
to intersect the sets we might observe that the intersection was empty. But 
we can draw no conclusion from this fact until we know that the subject and 
the verb belong to the same clause or proposition.46 The only legitimate 
source for this information is the grammar. However, the grammar we have 
chosen does not know about subjects and verbs. It only knows about subjects 
and predicates. The analysis must therefore continue. When the processor 
encounters the words for the patient, it will find them consistent with the 
information in the context, and will complete the predicate. It will then find 
that the predicate can syntactically combine with the subject, at which time 
the anomaly can be detected. 
However, at this point it is too late, as we can tell from the presence 
of a garden path effect in 61a. So we have failed to achieve incremental 
intepretation. Notice also that this is an absurd way to run a parser. In the 
toy example, extensions were very small sets. However, for realistic models 
they will be very large. Moreover, since they are constructed without benefit 
of syntactic information, we must potentially maintain vast numbers of such 
sets, most of which will never correspond to any syntactic analysis at all. 
(For example, merely because the flowers is locally categorised as a subject, 
we had to construct the set of all propositions with the referent as an object, 
despite the fact that no analysis will ever need the information.) 
Stabler [81], criticising an earlier version of this proposal,47 has argued 
that the present claims are in error, and that incremental interpretation of - 
right-branching constituents is in fact possible without violating the strong 
competence hypothesis in the strict sense used here. This claim does not go - 
through, and it is worth considering why. 
461n English, it happens that they must be. However, if we take advantage of this fact, 
we will be in violation of strict competence. In Japanese, which is verb-final and relative 
clause-initial, the assumption would break down. 
47Steedman [84]. 
First, it is important to be clear that Stabler technically does not adhere 
to strong competence in the strict sense. It is clear that he is assuming a 
weaker definition of the competence assumption, although he avoids an ex- 
plicit definiti~n.~' In particular, in his first worked example, [81, p.2261, he 
binds the variable Subj in the interpretation of the sentence to the interpre- 
tation of the actual subject, via partial execution in the rule I1 (p.208). This 
is only possible because he is using the grammar as a predictive parser. He 
uses this information to identify the fact that since the context only includes 
one predication over this subject, that must be the one that is to come, under 
a similar caricature of incremental evaluation to that used above. 
However, we have seen that this much is merely information that could 
legitimately have been built into the grammar itself, in the form of type 
raising. (In fact this analogy is effectively embodied in his second example 
using an LR parser, although the details here are less clear.)49 As in the 
example offered above, Stabler has not actually handled any interpretations 
that correspond to non-constituents. It is therefore more important to ask 
whether his processor in all other respects adheres to the strict hypothesis 
by avoiding interpretation of non-constituents of the The flowers sent vari- 
ety entirely, or whet her it violates the hypothesis by covertly constructing 
interpreted objects which are not merely constituents according to the com- 
petence grammar, either in the form of Earley-style dotted categories or in 
the form of partially instantiated semantic interpretations. 
Curiously, since his paper is ostensibly addressed to a predecessor of the 
present proposal, and despite the fact that he has technically allowed strict 
competence to be compromised, all of Stabler's actual examples take the 
first tactic. Thus in his exegesis of the (right-branching) sentence The joke is 
funny there is no sense in which there ever exists an interpretation of the non- 
constituent The joke is, or indeed anything comparable to The flowers sent 
(see Stabler [81, p.215 and 232]).50 Were he to address the question raised 
by example 61, his parser would offer no help. The fact is that Stabler's 
processor is neither consistent with the strict competence hypothesis, nor 
incrementally interpretative in the sense argued for here. 
4%ee p.233, note 1. 
49The use of LR tables is of course another technical violation of strict competence. 
50Stabler's note 3 suggests that he has not noticed that this is the central issue. 
The resolution of the paradox of incremental interpretation does not lie 
with St abler's parser, but rat her with the observation that competence gram- 
mar itself seems to be telling us that strings like Mary prefers and The flowers 
sent are in some sense constituents. It follows that we can retain the strict 
version of the strong competence hypothesis, and to continue to require the 
grammar to support incremental interpretation, if we also take on board 
the combinatory theory of grammar. This theory offers a broader definition 
of constituency, under which more substrings, and in particular more left 
prefixes, are associated with interpretations as a matter of grammar. The 
interpretations of such non-standard constituents can therefore be used to 
compare rival analyses arising from non-determinism on the basis of their fit 
to the context, without violating the strict competence hypothesis. 
The paper began by stating some uncontroversial assumptions, in the form 
of the rule-to-rule assumption, and the competence hypothesis, and deducing 
the even more widely accepted constituent condition on rules of competence 
grammar. Having noted the difficulties presented by coordination and into- 
nation viz-a-viz the constituent condition, the paper went on to advance an 
alternative view of competence grammar under which the paradoxical con- 
structions could be seen to conform to that condition after all. In Part 11, 
the consequences for performance under a "strict" version of the competence 
hypothesis were derived. 
The competence theory in question implies the strongest possible relation 
between surface structure, intonation structure and information structure. 
This property of the theory in itself has significant implications for processing 
under the strict competence hypothesis. The isomorphism between syntactic 
structure and intonational structure means that simply-structured modular 
processors which use both sources of information at once should be easier 
to devise. Such an architecture may reasonably be expected to simplify the 
problem of resolving local structural ambiguity in both domains. 
However, we have noted that a considerable amount of non-determinism 
remains in the grammar, both for spoken and written language. The prop- 
erties of the grammar are consistent with the suggestion that the basis for 
the oracle that renders the process as a whole deterministic is the incre- 
mental availability of semantic interpretations. The generalised notion of 
constituency that is engendered by the combinatory rules ensures that left- 
most substrings are potentially constituents with interpretations, subject of 
course to the limitations of the grammar and any further information that 
may be available from intonation. Such a theory of grammar may there- 
fore have an added advantage of parsimony, in being compatible with such a 
processor without compromising the strict competence hypothesis. 
Indeed, we can stand this argument on its head. If we believe that the 
parser has to know about interpretations corresponding to strings like the 
Bowers sent for . . . , and we identify such interpretations with the notion 
of abstraction, then the advocate of traditional grammar must ask them- 
selves why their grammar does not endorse such useful semantic concepts as 
grammatical constituents. 
The claim is strengthened by the observation that the residual non- 
determinism in the grammar of intonation, arising from the use of the null 
tone, as discussed in connection with example 43, is confined precisely to 
those occasions on which the theme is believed by the speaker to be entirely 
known to all parties, and to be recoverable by comparison of the interpre- 
tation of a (usually leftmost) substring with the contextually contextually 
open proposition. It would be surprising if the mechanism for disambiguat- 
ing written language were very different from its ancestor in the processor 
for spoken language. 
It is of course unlikely that we will ever know enough about the biological 
constraints to evaluate the assumptions on which the "strict" version of the 
competence hypothesis is based with any certainty. In the absence of such 
certainty, we must beware of falling into the error of evolutionary Panglos- 
sism. However, it is in order to speculate upon its implications for the theory 
as a whole, for the following reason. 
Competence grammar and performance mechanism are in the end a pack- 
age deal. Any claim about competence grammar is also a claim about the 
entire package. The theory of evolution is not mocked, and one day, a reckon- 
ing will be demanded. On that day, the linguistic theories that have survived 
the ordeal of descriptive adequacy will be judged not merely on their purity 
and parsimony as theories of competence, but on their explanatory value as 
part of the package. We have already noted that all theories will require 
something more, in the form of a language-independent mechanism for re- 
solving local ambiguity, or grammatical non-determinism, together with a 
language-independent algorithm and automaton. But if a theory of compe- 
tence requires much more than that, or if that mechanism in turn implicates 
a notion of structure that is not covered by the competence grammar, then 
those assumptions will weigh against it. If there is another theory that re- 
quires fewer such assumptions, perhaps even no further assumptions beyond 
the mechanism for resolving non-determinism and the minimal bottom-up 
algorithm, say because it has a different notion of surface syntax, then the 
scales may tilt in its favour. 
That day is not yet upon us, but it is good on occasion to meditate 
upon one's latter end. If it is true that the principal responsibility for local 
ambiguity resolution lies with incremental interpretation at extremely fine 
grain, then any theory which does not make similar assumptions to CCG 
about constituency in the competence grammar will, as we have seen above, 
have to make some strikingly similar structures available to the processor, 
complete with interpretations. Such additional assumptions would not in 
any sense be inconsistent with the competence theory itself. However, they 
compromise the strict version of the competence hypothesis. To the extent 
that the combinatory theory achieves the same result without any additional 
assumptions, it may be preferred. 
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